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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between a national regulator, an in-
cumbent and a local government in a context where investment in a new
network has to be undertaken. In the light of the recent debates on the com-
petition between private ﬁrms and local governments, we analyze the limits
to be put on the local public intervention in these markets. We show that
banning local government intervention can be welfare-enhancing either in
the presence inter-districts externality or with asymmetric information or in
case of conﬂicting objectives between the regulator and local governments.
1 Introduction
While network industries are subject to competition by now, public intervention
remains common, be it in the form of access regulation or universal service obli-
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1gations to name but a few. Moreover, private actors in these industries must under-
takesubstantial long-terminfrastructureinvestmentsin ordertogain acompetitive
edge over their rivals by offering higher-quality services to customers. The prof-
itability of these investments may be affected by other variables, though. First,
as hinted previously, new infrastructure networks, which typically involve a long-
term planing of coverage deployment, may be regulated by a national authority.
Second, public investment may limit the proﬁtability of private investment. Lo-
cal or regional authorities may indeed consider preemptive investment schemes
to foster the delivery of new services. This paper analyzes such a three-way in-
teraction between a national regulator, private actors and a local government, in
a context where both the private sector and the local government may invest in a
new infrastructure network.
The telecommunication industry is the sector where our analysis is the most
relevant.1 Indeed, next generation access networks will allow to reach higher
delivering speeds than ADSL2+ or cable technologies. Despite the uncertainty
surrounding the demand for these new services, many decision-makers foresee in
these investments a profound impact on the broadband market, but also on soci-
ety.2 Investment costs for the deployment of these networks and the upgrading of
the existing network are substantial, though, and entail some risks for private ac-
tors. In this context, some local public authorities or regional development agen-
cies have decided to build their own infrastructure in order to boost the delivery
of new services to their constituencies.
This behavior has been put into scrutiny both in the USA and in Europe. In
the United States, the controversy over the possibility to ban public intervention
has led more than 10 States to ban -partially or completely- municipal interven-
tion.3 In Europe, the 2009 Guidelines issued by the European Commission (see
EC(2009))acknowledgedtheproblemcreatedbynationalorlocalgovernmentin-
terventions in telecommunication markets. It claims that “it must be ensured that
State aid does not crowd out market initiative in the broadband sector. [State inter-
vention] could affect investment already made by broadband operators on market
terms and signiﬁcantly undermine the incentives of market operators to invest
in the ﬁrst place.” Even if the few evidence for the USA (see Hauge, Jamison,
and Gentry (2008)) suggest that private and public investment are more comple-
1Note that other sectors such as transportation can also suffer from the same problem. Indeed,
private ﬁrms may compete with public ones for managing competing airports or ferry lines.
2See OFCOM (2007) for instance.
3There is also a controversy on the cost of national regulation. See Jamison and Sichter (2010)
for the case of the telecommunication industry in the USA.
2mentary than substitutes, the debate is far from being settled. Our paper aims at
exploring some of the theoretical arguments in favor or against a regulation over
public intervention.
To this purpose, we build a canonical model of the relationship between a
national regulator, a local government and a private actor. The national territory is
divided into ‘districts’, which differ by the level of demand for new services and
the cost of building a new network.
An incumbent operator contemplates the decision whether to invest in a new
infrastructureineachdistrict. Suchaninfrastructurecanberentedtoacompetitive
fringe of operators to provide services to customers. For the incumbent to be
willing to invest, some access markup is needed to cover the investment cost. The
national regulator is in charge of regulating the access to the incumbent’s network.
The local government can decide to develop its own network infrastructure, in
which case it decides the terms of access to the local network. This government is
interested in the welfare of its constituency and, in particular, can use local public
funds to ﬁnance the network, as opposed to the regulator. We assume that the
local government is a priori less efﬁcient than the incumbent in building the new
network, but since the former can use public funds it may also set a lower access
charge on its network, thereby improving customers’ surplus.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the regulator sets the access
charge which applies to the incumbent’s network on the national territory. Sec-
ond, the incumbent decides whether to invest or not. Third, the local government
may invest in, and decide the terms of access to, a local network. Our goal is to
determine the optimal regulatory regime, that is, whether the local government
should be allowed to or banned from investing in a public network.4
Assume in a ﬁrst step a setting with only one district and assume that the local
government’s investment cost is publicly known. Then, we show that one should
always allow the local government to invest. Indeed, under complete information,
the incumbent can perfectly anticipate the local government’s decision and there
is no inefﬁcient duplication. The regulator, in turn, can set a regulated access tariff
which leaves the incumbent with no extra proﬁt, implying that the local govern-
ment’s objective becomes aligned with the regulator’s. In a nutshell, delegation of
the investment decision has no social costs in this setting.
Consider now a multi-district situation with externalities across districts. Two
4In our companion paper (Jullien, Pouyet, and Sand-Zantman (2009)) we investigate the pos-
sibility that the local government reaches a contractual agreement with the incumbent, including
subsidies, a possibility which is not allowed here.
3types of externalities can be envisioned. First, cost externality through scale effect
may make it less costly for the incumbent to deploy investment over the whole
territory. Second, demand externality may arise due to either network effects or
the mobility of consumers. In these settings, allowing duplication has some costs
and may be banned in some circumstances.
We then turn our attention to a situation in which neither the national regulator
nor the incumbent are informed about the local government’s investment cost.
Hence, the incumbent cannot perfectly foresee when it will be duplicated and is
thus exposed to a risk. In this context, duplication is no longer always efﬁcient and
the regulator faces two options. A ban on duplication removes the duplication risk
faced by the incumbent, but does not allow to beneﬁt from reduced access tariff
when the local government invests. By contrast, allowing duplication forces the
regulator to increase the regulated access price so as to compensate the incumbent
from the duplication risk. We show that if private investment is proﬁtable, then a
ban on duplication is socially optimal.
We ﬁnally discuss several situations where conﬂicting objectives between the
regulator and the local government have a bite. We show that the presence of
divergent objectives between these two agents may induce excessive public in-
vestment. This calls for adding regulatory tools (such as, for instance, a price-
ﬂoor or a reimbursement policy) and we study the impact of these instruments. At
last, we analyze the regulatory commitment issue and show that, under symmet-
ric information, a ban on duplication is time-consistent whereas a policy allowing
duplication may not be.
Our paper belongs to the theoretical literature on regulation in network indus-
tries (see Laffont and Tirole (2001) for instance). Our main departure is to focus
on the interaction between a regulator and a local government, each having spe-
ciﬁc attributes; hence, our paper is also related to the literature on the provision
of local public goods. A few articles have discussed the regulation process when
different market structures are possible. In this literature, the standard trade-off is
between granting access to the essential facility at a low price (or promoting com-
petition at the upstream level) and recouping the cost of investment. For example,
Dana and Spier (1994) made one of the ﬁrst contributions where the modes of
production and the market structure are endogenous. Even closer to our paper is
Caillaud and Tirole (2004) who highlight a conﬂict between social optimality and
ﬁnancial viability. We also have a similar conﬂict, but the potential competitor is
a local public agency. Moreover, we analyze the role of a national regulator in
mitigating this risk by choosing the regulation rules.
4The key ingredients of our model are exposed in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes
the benchmark case of complete information. Section 4 studies the multi-district
case and the impact of externality across districts on the desirability to ban dupli-
cation. Section 5 focuses on the duplication risk that arises when the incumbent
lacks some information about, and cannot predict, the local government’s inter-
vention. Section 6 discusses several problems originating from the conﬂicting
objectives between the national regulator and local governments. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Model
There is one representative geographical zone, called the ‘district’, characterized
by its level of demand for broadband services denoted by q.
Customers located on the district may beneﬁt from a new service provided by
a set of identical ﬁrms. The provision of this service requires access to an up-to-
date network. An incumbent operator, denoted by I, has the possibility to upgrade
its existing network at a cost c > 0 to allow the provision of the service.5
Accesstotheinfrastructurenetworkissetonanondiscriminatorybasisandthe
unit price is denoted by a. Service providers are assumed to behave competitively
with a constant marginal cost normalized to zero, so that the ﬁnal price p they
charge to customers is always equal to the access charge: p = a. The demand
is then qD(a) and we assume D(0) > 0. The corresponding consumers surplus
is denoted by qW(a), with W0(a) =  D(a). Let e(a) =  aD0(a)=D(a) be the
price elasticity of the demand. We assume that e(:) is increasing and e(0) = 0.
As it will always be optimal to set the price below the monopoly level, we restrict
attention to access prices a such that e(a)  1.
Access to the incumbent network is regulated. The regulator R is in charge
of the pricing of the access to the existing network and commits to an access
charge a = r prior to the decision of the incumbent to upgrade or not. Note that
this administrative body has no taxation power. Note also that the rule set by the
regulator must apply in all districts. Even if there are cases where regulatory rules
are tailored for speciﬁc districts, especially in the USA, it seems more common
that general rules are set at the national level on a uniform basis, especially when
there are cross-district externalities.
5This cost may depend on the observable characteristics of the district such as its density for
example.
5Instead of relying on the incumbent, a local government L, representing the
constituency of the district, may decide to build its own network. L’s cost is given
by k and is distributed on [k;+¥), according to a strictly positive density f(:) and
cumulative distribution function F(:). We assume that k  c to account both for
the speciﬁc ability of the incumbent and the cost of distortionary taxation since
this government has taxation power that he may use to ﬁnance the infrastructure.
The local government’s objective is to maximize the welfare of its constituency.
Even if local governments can intervene in many ways in markets (see Gillet,
Lehr, and Osorio (2004)), we focus on its role of infrastructure developer and
ﬁnancier, assuming that the rulemaking activities are managed by the national
regulator.
The network built by L is not subject to the access regulation that applies to
I’s network. However, in order to focus on the most relevant cases, we assume
(without loss of generality) that L does not implement an access price higher than
the regulated access price. If both the incumbent and the local government build
an upgraded network, there is Bertrand competition on the wholesale market for
access.
Events unfold as follows. First, regulator R decides on the price r for the
access to the incumbent’s network. Second, the value of k is realized. Third,
incumbent operator I decides whether to upgrade its network. Fourth, local gov-
ernment L decides whether to build a competing network. If it does, then it can
decide the terms of access to the local public network newly built. If it does not,
then broadband services might be provided using the already existing network at
the access price r decided by the regulator R.
The local government is thus allowed to intervene and to duplicate the invest-
ment of I or to invest when I fails to do so. We refer to this regime as the regime
D (for duplication or duopoly). We will compare that scenario with two other
possible regulatory regimes.
In regime L, the incumbent is not investing (because either regulation forbids
investmentorr islowenoughtodiscourageit)andL decidestoprovidetheservice
locally or not. Regime M (for monopoly) emerges when the local government is
not allowed to duplicate the infrastructure. In this case, the local government is
allowed to invest in a network only if the incumbent has not.6
6AnalternativewouldbetoforbidcompletelytheinterventionofLbutthiswouldbedominated
by regime M since investment by I would be the same, but L would invest less.
63 Benchmark
As a preliminary step, consider a single district and assume that the incumbent’s
and the local government’s investment costs are publicly known.
Let us ﬁrst analyze the investment decisions by the incumbent and the local
government.7 At the last stage of the game, L decides whether to duplicate the
network. Obviously, that decision depends on the choice made by I at the previous
stage. If I has not upgraded the network, then L decides to build its own network
if, and only if:
max
ar
qW(a)+qaD(a) k  0: (1)
The left-hand side of (1) is the welfare of the local government when it upgrades
the network, and sets optimally the access price for that network.8 The optimal




the network if, and only if:
max
ar
qW(a)+qaD(a) k  qW(r): (2)
The difference with inequality (1) is the gain for the local government if it de-
cides not to intervene and contents itself with broadband services being provided
to its local constituency at ﬁnal price r. Simple manipulations allow to rewrite
inequality (2) as:
k  ˆ kq(r) = q[W(0) W(r)]:
Let us now turn on to the decision faced by the local incumbent at the second
stage of the game. The incumbent is not willing to undertake the upgrading if it
expects to make losses from such a decision. Negative proﬁts arise either because
the level of demand for broadband services is too low to cover the ﬁxed cost of
the upgrading, or because the local government decides later on to bypass the







7Note that in this single-district setting, the government can be either central or local.
8That welfare is the sum of customers’ surplus and the access revenues generated by the local
public network, minus the ﬁxed cost of duplication k; it does not account for the incumbent’s
proﬁt.
7Situations in which the incumbent never invests (either because it is not eco-
nomically viable or because the incumbent expects to be duplicated by the local
government) are of limited interested. Therefore, we focus on cases in which in-
equality (3) is satisﬁed. It can be shown that condition (3) holds for some values
of the access price r set by the regulator and of the demand parameter q if k > c,
a condition which always holds in our model.
Social efﬁciency solves the following trade-off. The incumbent is more efﬁ-
cientthanthelocalgovernmenttobuildtheinfrastructure. However, asopposedto
the local government, the regulator cannot use taxation to ﬁnance the investment
and must distort the access price away from the marginal cost of access.
In a regime where the incumbent invests, the access price rbb implemented by
the regulator is such that the incumbent exactly breaks even, or qrbbD(rbb) = c.
Welfare is thus equal to: qW(rbb). If, by contrast, the regulator lets the local
government undertake the investment, L implements an access price which max-
imizes the welfare of its constituency only, which as we have seen, leads to a nil
access price. Welfare is thus equal to: qW(0) k.
Therefore, the ﬁrst-best investment rule is as follows: the incumbent invests
at a regulated access price rbb if and only if k  ˆ kq(rbb); otherwise, the local
government invests and sets a nil access price on the new infrastructure.
In this framework where all the relevant information is available to all the
actors, there are various ways to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. For instance,
the regulator can dictate which party has to undertake the investment. Or, R can
let the local government decide who has to make the investment (but R keeps the
power to set the access price if the incumbent builds the infrastructure).
Alternatively, suppose that R provides the incumbent with the incentives to
invest by setting an access price equal to rbb, and allows the local government
to duplicate the incumbent’s network. It is straightforward that this regulation
triggers the socially optimal investment choice at equilibrium of our game, i.e.
regime D implements the ﬁrst-best. By contrast, both regime M (which bans
duplication) and regime L (which prevents investment by the incumbent) are sub-
optimal under complete information.
This benchmark is summarized as follows.
Conclusion 1 With complete information and only one district, allowing duplica-
tion (i.e. regime D) implements the social optimum. The optimal regulated access
price is rbb and the incumbent invests iff k  ˆ kq(rbb).
8Key to the second part of Conclusion 1 are the facts that, ﬁrst, under complete
information L’s intervention is perfectly anticipated by I and R and, second, that
R sets an access charge which leaves no proﬁt to the incumbent so that L’s and
R’s objectives become perfectly aligned. The same conclusion would obviously
obtain with more than one district, provided that the regulator is able to charge
different access prices in districts with different characteristics.
In a context where the regulator’s information is limited, these results are pre-
served provided that (i) the incumbent and the local government share the same
information at their decision nodes and (ii) the regulator and the local government
maximize consumers welfare. Indeed, as long as the incumbent and the local gov-
ernment share the same information, any duplication will be perfectly anticipated
by the incumbent and no duplication will occur at equilibrium. Moreover, as long
as the regulator and the local government share the same objective, the latter’s
decision to invest or not will be optimal. Therefore, allowing duplication is still
optimal in this context.
4 Multiple districts and externality effects
Presentation. In this section, we consider the case of multiple districts but we
work under the assumption of a unique access charge nationwide. Indeed, the
common practice, in particular for broadband access, is to have a unique access
charge across all districts, referred to as a universal service obligation. One may
also justify the assumption of a unique regulated access price by the fact that the
regulator does not know the precise conditions in all districts (at least ex-ante at
the time the regulation is decided) and must base its decision on prior and general
knowledge.
Notice ﬁrst that since local conditions (costs or demand) differ from one dis-
trict to another, the choice of regulated price may either deter private ﬁrms from
investing or provide a strictly positive proﬁt in the districts with a low cost or a
high demand.
In this multi-district framework, we will study the impact of several types
of externality on the desirability to ban duplication. To discuss these issues, we
consider the case of two districts, 1 and 2. Each district i is characterized by
parametersqi andci whereci isinterpretedasthecostfortheincumbenttodevelop
the infrastructure in district i alone. We assume that the demand-adjusted cost is
larger in district 1 than in district 2: c2=q2  c1=q1.
9To simplify matters we focus on the externality exerted by duplication in dis-
trict 2 on district 1 by assuming that there is no local government in district 1
that can invest in infrastructure. Parameter k denotes then the cost for the local
government to build the infrastructure in district 2. Moreover we assume that the
regulator maximizes total consumers surplus; this allows to focus on inefﬁciencies
not related to conﬂicting objectives between the regulator and the local authorities
as a whole.9 The timing is as follows: the regulator chooses an access price r; the
incumbent decides whether to upgrade the network in each district; then the local
government in district 2 decides to invest or not in the infrastructure.
Case with no externality. In this ﬁrst case, the incumbent’s decisions to build
the infrastructure in each district are taken independently. More precisely, in
regime M, the incumbent invests in district i if and only if:
qirD(r) ci  0: (4)
Sincec2=q2 c1=q1, thesmallestregulatedchargerM inducinginvestmentinboth






W(rM)]= ˆ kq2. This decision rule is exactly the one that would be chosen by a reg-
ulator maximizing consumers surplus. Anticipating this behavior, the incumbent
will only invest on district 2 when k  ˆ kq2 but this will have no impact on its in-
vestment decision in district 1. This results can easily be extended to the case of
n districts and to the case where the risk of duplication concerns also district 1.
Therefore, in a multi-district framework with no externality, there is no reason to
ban duplication.
Cost externality. In some cases, duplication may prevent the incumbent from
exploiting scale economy at the level of the national territory, thereby creating
inefﬁciencies. It was assumed so far that the cost of providing the infrastructure
is ﬁxed in each district. In practice, though, there are common ﬁxed costs in
deploying infrastructures. To illustrate this effect, we extend the previous case
to introduce a technological externality. Formally, we assume that ci is the cost
of developing the infrastructure in district i only, while c1+c2 d is the cost of
9Section 6 looks at the polar case where the regulator aims to maximize social surplus
10developing the infrastructure in both districts. Thus, d can be seen as a common
ﬁxed cost.


















Note that the access charge rM is decreasing with the level of cost externality d.
Consider the case of regime D. Duplication occurs at r = rM if
k < q2[W (0) W (rM(d))] = ˆ kq2(d):
When this is the case, the regulator needs to set a price r = rD > rM such that
q1rDD(rD) = c1 to induce investment in district 1. Thus, duplication forces to
raise the price in district 1 to compensate for the foregone scale economies.
Duplication is efﬁcient if: q1W (rD)+q2W (0) k > (q1+q2)W (rM). Thus,
duplicationshouldbeforbiddenwhen: ˆ kq2(d) q1[W (rM) W (rD)]<k< ˆ kq2(d).
Since rM decreases with d, an increase in the cost externality has two impacts.
First, from an ex-ante point of view, it decreases the incentive to duplicate since
ˆ kq2(d) decreases with d. Second, the range of k with inefﬁcient duplication in-
creases since q1[W (rD) W (rM)] increases. Therefore, in the case of cost exter-
nality, it may be optimal to ban duplication and this ban is all the more beneﬁcial
that the externality is large.
Demand externality. Demand externality is another reason that may induce the
legislator to ban duplication. Two different sources of demand externality can
be envisioned: network externality and competition between districts for mobile
consumers. Let us study these two cases in turn.
To consider the case of network externality, we slightly change the two-district
framework by assuming that consumers in district 1 beneﬁt from the fact that
district 2’s consumers are served by the same ﬁrm as themselves. Formally, we
assume that the net consumer surplus in district 1 is given by:
11 (q1+ ˆ q)W(r) if the incumbent is the provider in the second district;
 q1W(r) if the second district market is served by the local government.
This case coincides exactly with the case of cost externality studied above.
Indeed, when duplication is not allowed -in regime M-, the incumbent builds the
infrastructure in both districts if:
(q1+ ˆ q +q2)rD(r) (c1+c2)  0;
(q1+ ˆ q)rD(r) c1  0;
(q2+ ˆ q)rD(r) c2  0:













In this case, the access charge rM is decreasing with the level of network external-
ity ˆ q.







= ˆ kq2( ˆ q):
When this is the case, the regulator needs to set a price r = rD > rM such that
q1rDD(rD) = c1 to induce investment in district 1. Thus, duplication forces to
raise again the price in district 1 to compensate for the foregone network external-
ity and it should be forbidden when: ˆ kq2( ˆ q)+q1[W (rD) W (rM)] < k < ˆ kq2( ˆ q).
Therefore, in the case of network externality, it may be optimal to ban duplication.
To study the case of district competition with mobile agents we amend our
framework by assuming that ˆ q represents a mass of mobile agents, either wealthy
consumers or ﬁrms, who choose their location according to the proposals made
by the districts. We assume that those agents are initially located in district 1 and
that the mobile agents cannot modify the ranking of the cost/demand ratio across
districts, i.e. c2=q2  c1=(q1+ ˆ q)  c1=q1.
Note that the local government in district 2 maximizes the surplus of the initial
population in its own district. More precisely, it considers only the immobile
agents even if, ex-post, mobile agents turn out to settle in district 2.10 In the
10This assumption builds on the fact the local government is a representative (possibly elected)
of the inhabitants of the district, and, therefore, is subject to the inﬂuence of the agents living in
the district at the moment of making choices.
12absence of any mobility, the local government would choose a price equal to zero
for the use of the infrastructure in case of duplication. But this would not deter
the incumbent from investing in district 1 since the price ensuring budget-balance
would not change. In case of mobility, the consumers leaving district 1 would
drive up the price in this district. Note that the price in district 2 may be above
zero in order to increase local revenues to a lesser extent than the regulated price
that prevails in district 1 however. As in the case of network externality, this
mobility will induce an inefﬁciency in the duplication decision.
We summarize this discussion as follows:
Conclusion 2 Cost or demand externalities may justify a ban on duplication.
5 Duplication risk and risk premium
This section is devoted to the analysis of our game taking into account some asym-
metries of information between the incumbent and the local government. More
precisely, the informational gap is now between, on one side, the regulator and
the incumbent, and, on the other side, the local government since we assume that
only L knows its investment cost k.11 In this section, we keep on assuming that
the level of demand q is public information.
The crucial difference between this informational setting and the one devel-
oped in the previous sections is that, now, the incumbent cannot perfectly foresee
the local government’s duplication decision. Duplication may then arise with a
strictly positive probability at equilibrium, leading the regulator to compensate
the incumbent for this risk in order to stimulate private investment.
When k  ˆ kq(r), the local government bypasses the existing network and
builds its own public network. Assuming duplication is authorized, the regula-
tor has two options: trigger investment by the incumbent ﬁrm, or not.
In the ﬁrst case, deﬁne the access price rD such that the incumbent is just





The regulator then sets r = rD to induce investment. Of course rD may not exist,
in which case the regime with duplication is equivalent to regime L since the
11Superior information of the incumbent, for instance on the level of demand, would not invali-
date our results.
13incumbent is deterred from investing. The choice is thus between regime M and
regime L: Regime M then dominates if:
qW (rbb) > Efmax(qW (0) k;0)g:
To focus on the interesting cases, we assume from now on that rD exists.
Then under the regime D, the regulated access charge that maximizes welfare
with private investment is rD: Expected welfare in the regime with duplication















Another option is to deter the incumbent from investing by setting too low an
access price (for instance r <rD); only the local government does invest, provided




Interestingly, the comparison of the two regulatory policies turns out to be
unambiguous:
Lemma 1 Assumethatthereisasymmetricinformationonthelocalgovernment’s
cost parameter only and that rD exists. Then regime D with r = rD dominates
regime L.















Obviously, the second integral in the last expression is positive. Notice also that,
for any r, ˆ kq(r)  qW(0) and that ˆ kq(r)  k  qW(0) is equivalent to q[W(0) 
W(r)]kqW(0). Therefore, theﬁrstintegralisalsopositive. Wethusconclude
that WD >WL.
The next step is to determine when it is optimal to ban the intervention of the
localgovernment(regimeM). Obviously, thereisatrade-off. Ontheonehand, the
14intervention of the local government arises provided that its cost parameter is not
too high and allows to beneﬁt from a reduced ﬁnal price. On the other hand, since
the incumbent can no longer perfectly anticipate the local government’s ex-post
intervention due to asymmetric information, the incumbent’s ex-ante incentive to
invest weakens, thereby forcing the regulator to increase the access price.
Formally, if there is a ban on the intervention by the local government, the
regulator provides the incumbent with the incentives to upgrade the network by
setting the access price rM =rbb (such that qrbbD(rbb) c=0). Expected welfare
is thus given by: WM = qW(rbb).
ComparingWM and WD, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 Assumethatthereisasymmetricinformationonthelocalgovernment’s
cost parameter only and that rD exists. Then it is preferable to ban duplication
and induce investment by the incumbent, i.e. regime M dominates regime D.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 states that when the incumbent invests and there is some duplication,
it would be better to simply induce investment with no duplication. The result is
due to the fact that inducing the incumbent to invest requires compensating it for
the risk of duplication by raising the access charge. Compared to setting rbb with
no duplication, the increase in access charge offsets any beneﬁts that may arise
from the local government’s intervention.
As opposed to the previous case of symmetric information, duplication is not
always efﬁcient because rD >rbb. There exists a range of cost k where duplication
occurs while it would be more efﬁcient to let the incumbent invest but with the
break-even access charge rbb.
Conclusion 3 When there is asymmetric information on the local government’s
cost parameter only, then the regime with duplication is dominated by a regime
without duplication.
In real-life situations, the areas on which duplication occurs are not exactly the
same as the ones covered by private investment. Therefore, local government in-
tervention may improve global coverage. There would then be a trade-off between
increased coverage and a rise in the ex-ante regulated tariff.
156 Divergent objectives
General analysis. Divergence of objectives between the regulator and the local
government occurs when the regulator accounts for the welfare of some agents
that are outside the jurisdiction of the local government. As discussed above,
this occurs when there are externalities between districts. This is also the case
when R accounts for the private sector’s proﬁt. To discuss this issue we consider
a district in a multi-district context and assume that the regulated access charge r
does not depend on the level of demand q that prevails in this particular district.
We assume also that the incumbent knows k, that there is no externality and we
consider a district where the proﬁt qrD(r) c is positive.
LetusassumethatRmaximizestotalwelfare, i.e. thesumofconsumersurplus
and proﬁt. There may then be a conﬂict of objective as L duplicates when k <
ˆ kq (q) = q [W(0) W (r)] while from a total welfare perspective this is efﬁcient
only if qW(0) k  qW(r)+qrD(r) c or k < ˆ kq (q) [qrD(r) c].
If the local governments cost were observable ex-ante12 by the regulator, then
R simply has to establish an ex-ante list of the districts were duplication is allowed
or not. The incumbent then refrains from investing in those cases where it antic-
ipates that the local government will duplicate. Symmetric information between
R and I implies that no inefﬁcient duplication arises at equilibrium. For a given
access tariff r, this ex-ante rule implements the optimal outcome.
In many cases, though, the regulator lacks such a knowledge about k. Then
allowing duplication results in inefﬁcient duplication whenever k lies between
ˆ kq (q)   [qrD(r) c] and ˆ kq (q). In this case, only inefﬁcient duplication can oc-
cur so that a ban on duplication is optimal if the expected welfare gain conditional
on duplication occurring is less that the proﬁt. This writes as
ˆ kq(r) E

k j ˆ kq(r) > k
	
< qrD(r) c (5)
Conclusion 4 Assume I and L share the same information. From a total welfare
perspective, allowing duplication (regime D) induces excessive public investment.
A ban on duplication is not optimal if the incumbent’s proﬁt is small.
Thus, duplication should be allowed only in districts with low demand or large
cost.
12That is, before the investment decision by the incumbent.
16Constraining local governments’ intervention. Faced with the difﬁculty of
predicting the level of k; the regulator may try to use alternative instruments to
curb local activism. We consider here two types of intervention: price-ﬂoor and
compensation.
Suppose that if duplication arises, then the regulator can impose a price-ﬂoor
on the local government’s network: that is, the price to access L’s infrastructure
cannot be lower than l  r.13 Thus, the incumbent decides to invest as long as
it expects not to be duplicated and the local government duplicates when k 









Starting from regime D, implementing a small price-ﬂoor is optimal if:
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Imposing a price-ﬂoor has both a cost and a beneﬁt. The cost is that the service is
provided less efﬁciently by the local government when it invests and it is incurred
with probability F(ˆ kq). The beneﬁt is that there is less inefﬁcient public invest-
ment, where the level of inefﬁciency is of the order of I’s proﬁt and the marginal
effect is captured by the density. A positive price ﬂoor is then optimal only if the
inefﬁciency in investment decisions is large.14 By contrast:
Conclusion 5 Imposing a price-ﬂoor to local authorities is not optimal when the
incumbent’s proﬁt from investing is small.
Anotherpossibilityistorequirethatifthelocalgovernmentduplicates, itcom-
pensates the incumbent for its investment by reimbursing c: Thus, the incumbent
decides to invest as long as it expects not to be duplicated and the local govern-
ment duplicates when k  ˆ kq (q) c. Expected welfare with reimbursement ac;








13As it should be clear, a price-cap has no bite in our context.
14The condition (6) is sufﬁcient if the hazard rate F(:)=f(:) is increasing.
17Starting from regime D, implementing a full reimbursement policy is optimal
if ˜ W(r;a = 1)  ˜ W(r;a = 0) > 0 which can be written as:
ˆ kq(r) E





Condition (7) shows that when the regulated access price leaves the incumbent
with no proﬁt, then a reimbursement policy is not warranted. A regime with au-
thorization of duplication is optimal in that case.
Complications arise when the regulated access tariff departs from this break-
even point. For a district with a large demand, so that the incumbent proﬁt tends
to be large in that district, a reimbursement rule tends to be optimal.
Conclusion 6 Imposing a full reimbursement policy is not optimal when the in-
cumbent’s proﬁt from investing is small.
Commitment issues. One issue with policy constraining ex-ante the local gov-
ernment is that the regulator may lack the commitment power to implement it
ex-post, once the incumbent has sunk the investment cost. To discuss this issue
without excessive technicalities, let us assume that R knows the cost k. Then R
optimally bans duplication and the incumbent invests when
ˆ kq(r) k < qrD(r) c (8)
Suppose that L knows that R is not consistent over time. Then, after the ﬁrm
has invested, the local government may ask the regulator to change the rule. On
regards of such a request, R would reconsider the policy and allow the duplication
only if the welfare gain is positive. At this stage the cost c is sunk by the ﬁrm
so that R would remove the ban if qW(0) k > qW(r)+qrD(r); or k < ˆ kq (r) 
qrD(r): But this cannot be the case under Condition (8) since c is positive. Thus
R would always refuse to renegotiate a ban with L.
However the alternative scenario where the regulator could impose a ban ex-
post could occur, although this seems less credible. Indeed suppose that despite
the fact that duplication is allowed and k < ˆ kq (r) qrD(r)+c; the ﬁrm invests
and then asks the regulator to impose a ban on duplication. Again the request is
made once the cost c is sunk. Thus R would be willing to impose the ban if k >
ˆ kq (r) qrD(r): Thus for k in the interval
 ˆ kq (r) qrD(r);ˆ kq (r) qrD(r)+c

the policy would be revised ex-post and duplication would be banned. Thus:
18Conclusion 7 Undersymmetricinformation, abanonduplicationistime-consistent,
but a policy allowing duplication may not be.
Notice that this implies that without commitment and with a sophisticated ﬁrm
able to manipulate the policy making process, there will be an excessive level of
investment by the ﬁrm and insufﬁcient intervention by the local government.
7 Conclusion
Investment by local governments may help fostering the fast development of new
telecommunication infrastructures and reaching a large coverage of population.
As such it may be an important element of public policies aiming at reducing the
potential gap between highly competitive zones and less competitive ones. Still,
public policy should guard itself from potential crowding out of efﬁcient private
investment, which may occur when public investment is not restricted to areas
where private investment is deﬁcient.
Our paper helps understanding the issues at stake by focusing on situations
where conditions for competition are not met, but it is not obvious whether a regu-
lated private monopoly dominates a local public investment.Thus our conclusions
are valid in such grey areas where competition is not effective enough.
We identify three key dimensions that should be considered with special at-
tention when designing rules governing the intervention of local authorities. First
the impact of inter-district externalities when the regulator chooses uniform rules
independent of the local conditions (as demand and costs). Second, the risk born
by private investors, that may refrain them from investing in the context of un-
certainty. Costly ex-ante weakening of regulation is then required to restore in-
vestment incentives. Our results suggest that when this is the sole distortion, the
beneﬁts of local intervention do not outweigh the cost of lenient regulation. Last,
other issues relate to differences between the motives of the local authorities and
the social welfare and the lack of commitment power of the national regulator.
In discussing these issues we ignored political economy or prestige consid-
erations that may lead politicians to invest excessively in advanced technologies
at the expense of less rewarding but more useful local goods. Our discussion of
the regulation with conﬂicting objectives doesn’t clearly support banning dupli-
cation but rather suggests that some form of control and limits on local public
intervention may help improve efﬁciency.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Note ﬁrst that if there is no investment in regime D, banning duplication has no
effect since the regulatory choice is only between allowing the incumbent to invest
20with no duplication, or no investment by the incumbent and investment by the
local government. Assume from now on that there is investment in regime D.
One has to show thatWM WD is always positive when duplication arises with










Note ﬁrst that when c=0, then rD =rbb =0 and ˆ kq(rD)=0. Therefore, K(0)=0.











Remark that rbb and rD are increasing functions of c. Let us consider ﬁrst
the deﬁnition of rbb. It is the smallest solution of the following relationship:
qrbbD(rbb) c=0. Itexists for c less thanthe monopoly proﬁt. Using theimplicit







since rbb  am = argmaxaaD(a).
Similarly, rD is deﬁned as the smallest solution of: [1 F(ˆ kq(rD)]qrDD(rD) 
c=0. Sinceforc=0thesolutionisrD =0, andusingacontinuityargument, there
are solutions to the previous equation for small c and a straightforward argument
shows that the smallest one is increasing with c. Notice that rbb exists if rD exists.
There may be upward discontinuities of rD. At such point K(:) has an upward
discontinuity. Now, where rD is continuous, it is differentiable and the derivative





























21Now, using the positivity of the denominator, we can state that:





















































(rD)f(ˆ kq(rD)) =  qD(rD)f(ˆ kq(rD))  0:
So K0(c)  0 when rD is continuous. Thus K(c) is non-decreasing with c. Using
the fact that K(0) = 0, we obtain that K(c) is non-negative on its domain.
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